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Abstract 
Uncertainty and learning play an important role in addressing the problem of climate 
change. In stylized game-theoretic models of international environmental treaty 
formation, which capture the strategic interactions between nations, it has been shown 
that learning usually has a negative impact on the success of cooperation. This paper 
asks the question whether this negative conclusion carries over to an applied multi-
regional climate model. This model captures the large heterogeneity between different 
world regions and considers not only uncertainty about the benefits but also about the 
costs from climate mitigation. By exploiting differences in costs and benefits between 
regions and allowing transfers to mitigate free-rider incentives, we derive much more 
positive conclusions about the role of learning. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges to international co-operation the 
world is presently facing (Stern 2007 and IPCC 2007). Currently, a “Post-Kyoto” 
agreement is being negotiated that sets greenhouse gas emission targets for the period 
after 2012, the so-called “second commitment period”. One important element for the 
success of this new agreement is to ensure participation of all major polluters, 
including the USA, as well as the new emerging polluters China and India. 
There are four key issues that make the climate change problem so difficult to solve: 
(i) the process of climate change is effectively irreversible; (ii) there are considerable 
uncertainties about the benefits and costs from mitigating climate change; (iii) our 
understanding of these uncertainties changes over time as a result of learning more 
about climate science and possible technological responses; (iv) the problem is global, 
but since there is no global authority that can enforce a climate treaty, international 
environmental agreements (IEAs) require voluntary participation.  
The first three issues have been studied for instance by Kolstad (1996a, b), Ulph and 
Ulph (1997), Ulph and Maddison (1997) and Narain, Fisher and Hanemann (2007), 
though typically in the context of a single social planner. Depending on the model 
specification and assumptions, uncertainty either calls for laxer environmental 
standards today in order to benefit from more information about mitigation options in 
the future or calls for tougher standards in accordance with the precautionary 
principle, taking in consideration possibly high and irreversible environmental 
damages in the future. Short-term tighter environmental standards may also spur 
technological innovation, thus reducing future abatement costs, but may also cause 
lock-in effects if abatement options are associated with high fixed costs. In any case, 
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in the context of a social planner, global welfare with learning is higher than without 
learning, as better informed decisions can be taken. We call this the information effect 
from learning.  
There has also been an extensive literature, starting with Carraro and Siniscalco 
(1993) and Barrett (1994), followed by many others as surveyed for instance in 
Barrett (2003) and Finus (2003, 2008), on the fourth issue, though mainly in the 
context of perfect information. The conclusions have been rather pessimistic: while 
there are substantial benefits from cooperation, self-enforcing IEAs achieve only 
little. 
Recently, several efforts have been made to combine these two strands of literature 
(Na and Shin 1998, Ulph 1998, Ulph 2004, Baker 2005, Ingham et al. 2007, Kolstad 
2007, Dellink et al. 2008, Kolstad and Ulph 2008, 2009). Ulph (1998) demonstrates in 
a two-player-two-period model that in the Nash equilibrium, due to a negative 
strategic effect from learning as we call it, learning may lead to lower individual and 
global payoffs than no learning. Na and Shin (1998) confirm this negative conclusion 
about the role of learning in a stylized three-player model of coalition formation. By 
construction, and as in the model by Ulph (1998), players are ex-ante symmetric but 
learn to be asymmetric ex-post and hence to benefit unequally from an IEA. Due to 
what we label a negative stability effect from learning, learning leads to a smaller 
stable IEA and lower global welfare. The possibility of a negative effect from learning 
is also captured in the dynamic coalition formation model in Ulph (2004) who 
distinguishes the case of variable membership (membership may change over time) 
and fixed membership (membership is decided once and for all). He finds that in the 
case of fixed membership, as we assume in our analysis, the expected level and 
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variance of damages determine whether learning has a positive effect on the size of 
stable coalitions and global welfare.  
Kolstad (2007) and Kolstad and Ulph (2008, 2009) extend and systematize the role of 
uncertainty, learning and IEA formation of which we make use in this paper. In a two-
stage coalition formation game in which countries choose their membership in the 
first stage and their abatement strategies in the second stage, they distinguish three 
cases. 1) Uncertainty is not resolved. This is the case of no learning. 2) Uncertainty is 
not resolved before the second stage. This corresponds to the case of partial learning. 
3) Uncertainty is resolved before the first stage. This corresponds to the case of full 
learning. In the two cases with learning, learning is perfect in the sense that all 
players learn the values of all uncertain parameters and no uncertainty remains.
1
 All 
three papers confirm in a stylized model the negative role of learning.  
This negative conclusion is certainly intriguing as it suggests that in the strategic 
context of IEA formation learning is bad, questioning intensified research efforts in 
climate change in recent years as well as the dissemination of knowledge through 
international institutions like International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Hence, 
one may wonder whether this result holds generally or may be an artifact of the 
special construction of these models. For instance, all models exclusively concentrate 
on uncertainty about the benefits from climate mitigation, assume symmetry with 
respect to abatement costs (and often also with respect to the benefits from global 
abatement) and abstract from transfers that could mitigate asymmetries of the gains 
from cooperation among players. Moreover, in Ulph (2004), Kolstad (2007) and 
                                                 
1  Thererfore, the term “partial learning” may be confusing as it reflects the timing of learning, 
not the nature of learning, i.e. all information is revealed before stage 2. An alternative term  
could be “delayed learning”. To ease comparison with the studies of Kolstad and Ulph, we 
adopt their terminology. 
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Kolstad and Ulph (2008, 2009) the payoff function is linear, implying binary 
equilibrium abatement strategies in the second stage of coalition formation: abate or 
not abate. In order to shed some light on this issue, we extend the model of Dellink et 
al. (2008), an applied climate-economy model with twelve world regions. Different 
from their analysis, we consider not only the case of no and full learning but also 
partial learning; we furthermore introduce transfers. From our numerical simulations, 
we derive much less negative conclusions: learning is always better than no learning 
(e.g. generates higher global welfare) and full learning is better than partial learning if 
accompanied by a transfer scheme, mitigating free-rider incentives in an optimal way. 
In the following, we lay out the theoretical setting in Section 2, describe the applied 
model in Section 3 and report about our results in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes 
our main findings and draws some conclusions. 
2. The Models of Coalition Formation and Learning 
In order to relate the three models of uncertainty and learning (no learning, partial 
learning, full learning) to the standard model without uncertainty, we start by 
describing the deterministic setting. For the purpose of expositional simplicity, we 
abstract from time-dependencies in the payoff function in this section, and explain the 
dynamics in the context of our applied model in Section 3. 
2.1 Certainty 
Consider a set of N  heterogeneous players, each representing a country or world 
region. Moreover, consider the following simple two-stage coalition formation game, 
frequently applied in the analysis of IEAs.
2
 In the first stage, players decide whether 
                                                 
2  For an overview see for instance Barrett (2003) and Finus (2003, 2008). 
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to become a member of an IEA or to remain an outsider. Announcement 1ic   means 
“player i  joins the agreement” and announcement 0ic   “player i  remains an 
outsider”, i.e. remains a singleton (sometimes called a fringe player); a coalition 
structure c  is then described by the announcement vector 1 Nc ( c , ..., c ) , c C . 
Players that announce 1 are called coalition members and this set is denoted by 
 1 1ik i c , i ,...,N    . Thus, in this simple setting, a coalition structure is 
entirely defined by coalition k . Hence, we can use the term coalition structure and 
coalition interchangeably. We denote the set of coalitions by K . 
In the second stage, players choose their abatement levels. This leads to abatement 
vector 1 Nq ( q , ..., q ) . The payoff of an individual player i , i i( q,z )  depends on 
abatement vector q , i.e. the strategies of all players, due to the public good nature of 
climate change, and on a vector of parameters iz  that enter the payoff function of 
player i . 
The game is solved backward assuming that strategies in each stage must form a Nash 
equilibrium. For the second stage, this entails that abatement strategies form a 
coalitional Nash equilibrium between coalition k  and the fringe players j k : 
0 :
  
 
  
   
* * *
i k i ki k k i i k k i k
* * * * *
j j k j j j j k j j j j
( q ,q ,z ) ( q ,q ,z ) q and
j,c ( q ,q ,q ,z ) ( q ,q ,q ,z ) q
 
 
    (1) 
where kq  is the abatement vector of coalition k , kq  the vector of all players not 
belonging to k , jq  abatement of fringe player j , and jq  the vector of all other 
fringe players except j . An asterisk denotes equilibrium strategies. 
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Since in the context of our applied model the equilibrium abatement strategy vector 
*q  is unique for every coalition structure k  and a given matrix of parameters z , there 
is a unique vector of equilibrium payoffs for every coalition structure k  (see the proof 
in Olieman and Hendrix 2006). These are called valuations: *i iv ( k, ) ( q ( k, ))z z . 
Since coalition structure k  follows from announcement vector c  we may also write: 
*
i iv ( c, ) ( q ( c, ))z z .
3
 
Also in the first stage, stability requires that strategies form a Nash equilibrium. That 
is, no member that announced 1ic   should have an incentive to change this 
announcement to 0ic   (internal stability) and no fringe player that announced 0ic   
should want to announce 1ic   (external stability), given the announcement of other 
players ic . These conditions are compactly summarized by the stability function 
s( c, )z , which assigns the value 1 to a stable and the value 0 to an unstable 
announcement vector: 
1 0
0
i i i i i i i iif  i N, c =1-c : v ( c ,c , ) v ( c ,c , )s( c, )
else
 
    
 

z z
z
 
   (2) 
where c  is constructed by changing the announcement of one player at a time. Note 
that the singleton coalition structure is stable by definition as it can be supported by 
an announcement vector where all players announce 0ic  . Hence, single deviations 
make no difference. Consequently, existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed. 
                                                 
3  We adopt the convention that equilibrium abatement strategies are derived from payoffs that 
depend on individual parameters whereas valuations, which depend on equilibrium strategies 
of all players depend on all parameters. 
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It is worth noting that for any given set of parameters z , this function may imply 
multiple stable coalitions. We denote the set of Pareto-undominated stable coalitions 
by ( ) C z  and the number of stable Pareto-undominated coalitions by # ( ) z . In 
order to measure the success of coalition formation, we compute the average 
aggregate valuation over all Pareto-undominated stable coalitions: 
1
N
c C i is( c, ) v ( c, )v( ( ))
# ( )


  
z z
z
z
, assuming that all Pareto-undominated stable 
coalitions are equally likely. In a similar spirit, we could compute other indicators of 
global performance like the average abatement or, as we do in our numerical 
simulations, the average concentration of CO2 (see Sections 3 and 4).  
Note finally that our assumption about the second stage abstracted from the possibility 
of transfers, i.e. *i iv ( c, ) ( q ( c, ))z z . In the context of heterogeneous players this 
may imply quite different valuations and hence asymmetric gains from cooperation. 
This may hamper the formation of large stable coalitions and hence the success of 
cooperation as has been demonstrated for instance in Bosello et al. (2003) and 
Botteon and Carraro (1997). However, it has also been shown that the assumption 
about the particular transfer scheme can crucially affect the set of stable coalitions 
(Carraro et al. 2006). In order to avoid this sensitivity, we employ the concept of an 
almost ideal transfer scheme put forward by Eyckmans and Finus (2004), with a 
similar notion in Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2005), McGinty (2007) and Weikard 
(2009). The idea builds on the observation that a coalition k  derived from an 
announcement vector c  is potentially internally stable ( 1PIs ( c, )z ) or potentially 
internally unstable ( 0PIs ( c, )z ) if and only if 
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 1 1 0
0
 

    
 

i i i i i i i i iPI
i k
if  i, c , c =1-c : v ( c ,c , ) v ( c ,c , )
s ( c, )
else
z z
z
 
   (3) 
In other words, if and only if 1PIs ( c, )z  there exists a transfer scheme that makes 
announcement vector c  internally stable. As shown in Eyckmans and Finus (2004), a 
sharing scheme addressing potential internal stability gives every coalition member its 
free-rider payoff when leaving the coalition, i i iv ( c ,c , ) z , plus an (arbitrary) share i  
of the surplus which is the aggregate payoff of the coalition minus the sum of free-
rider payoffs: 
 1 Ti i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i k
i, c : v ( c ,c , ) v ( c ,c , ) v ( c ,c , ) v ( c ,c , )   

 
      
z z z z   
0 Tj j j j j j jj, c : v ( c ,c , ) v ( c ,c , )   z z       (4) 
1i
i k


   
where the superscript T  implies valuations after transfers. This means that transfers 
are only paid among coalition members, these transfers balance, i.e. there are no 
external sources of transfers. This sharing scheme has some interesting properties: all 
transfer systems belonging to this scheme, irrespective of the set of shares, leads not 
only to the same set of internally stable coalitions but also externally stable coalitions 
and hence stable coalitions (robustness). This is because a coalition k  is only 
externally stable if and only if all coalitions k j  for all j k  are not potentially 
internally stable and hence not internally stable. Moreover, this transfer scheme 
stabilizes those coalitions that generate the highest aggregate welfare among those 
coalitions that can be stabilized at all (optimality), which may not be possible for 
some larger coalitions due to too strong free-rider incentives. This also means that an 
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expansion of stable coalitions through transfers from insiders to outsiders is not 
feasible (Carraro et al. 2006). In other words, this transfer scheme exhausts all 
possibilities of cooperation. 
For practical purposes of determining stable coalitions, we only have to replace 
iv ( c, )z  in (2) by 
T
iv ( c, )z , assuming the transfer scheme in (4). 
2.2 Uncertainty 
In a stochastic model, the matrix of deterministic parameters z  is replaced by the 
stochastic matrix Z  with distribution  i ,uf z  for a particular parameter i ,uz  in player 
i ’s payoff function,  i ,u i ,u i ,uz z ,z ,4  1u ,...,  , where the payoff function of all 
players comprises the same number of parameters  . We assume that this distribution 
is common knowledge. 
2.2.1 No Learning 
In the case of No Learning, in the second stage, the true parameter values are not 
revealed and thus expected payoffs have to be maximized. Thus, equilibrium 
condition (1) is replaced by  
0 :
  
 
        
         
* * *
i k i ki k k i i k k i k
* * * * *
j j k j j j j k j j j j
E ( q ,q ,Z ) E ( q ,q ,Z ) q and
j,c E ( q ,q ,q ,Z ) E ( q ,q ,q ,Z ) q
 
 
    (5) 
where    
1
1
1 1
i , i ,
i , i ,
z z
i i i i i , i , i , i ,
z z
E ( , ,Z ) ... ( , ,z )f z ,...,z dz ...dz   


   . Since in our applied 
model payoffs are linear in parameters (but not in abatement levels), certainty 
                                                 
4  These bounds can be minus and plus infinity, e.g. in the case of a normal distribution. 
 10 
equivalence holds (see Dellink et al. 2008), i.e.  i i i iE ( , ,Z ) ( , ,E( Z ))    - the 
expected payoff is equal to the payoff with expected parameter vector iE( Z ) . We 
denote the equilibrium abatement vector satisfying the inequality system (5) by 
NL*q ( c )  and derive (expected) valuations NL NL NL*i iv ( c, E[ ]) ( q ( c, E[ ])Z Z . 
Again, we may distinguish a case without and with transfers, as mentioned for the 
deterministic setting above. 
In the first stage, stability with definition (2), replacing valuations in the deterministic 
setting by expected valuations: 1NLs ( c, ) Z  iff : NL NLi ii v ( c,E( )) v ( c,E( )) Z Z , 
0 else.  
As in the deterministic setting, we can compute an indicator of global performance: 
1
NL NLN
NL NL c C i i
NL
s ( c, ) v ( c,E( ))
v v( ( ))
# ( )


   
Z Z
Z
Z
, which is the average expected 
aggregate valuation over all Pareto-undominated stable coalitions. 
2.2.2 Partial Learning 
In the case of Partial Learning, in the second stage, before players choose their 
abatement strategies, they learn the value of the stochastic matrix Z . Hence, they 
make the correct abatement decision based on realization z  of Z : 
*
i i i iv ( c, z ) ( q ( c, z ))  where again the case without and with transfers may be 
distinguished. Since players have to decide upon their membership under uncertainty, 
they will base their decision in the first stage on expected valuations: 
 
1
1
1 1
i , i ,
i , i ,
z z
PL
i i i i i , i , i , i ,
z z
v ( c,z ) E( v ( c, )) ... v ( c, )f z ,...,z dz ...dz   Z z


  . Hence, in order to 
determine stable coalitions with the stability function defined in (2), we only have to 
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replace the valuation by the expected valuation as in the case of no learning (though 
both expected values are different!): 1PLs ( c, ) Z  iff : PL PLi ii v ( c ) v ( c )   , 0 else. 
We compute the associated indicator of global performance: 
1
PL PLN
PL PL c C i i
PL
s ( c, ) v ( c ))
v v( ( ))
# ( )


   
Z
Z
Z
. 
2.2.3 Full Learning 
In the case of Full Learning, players know even before the first stage the realization of 
the stochastic matrix Z . Hence, analogously to the deterministic setting, for 
realization z: 1FL is ( c,z )   iff 
FL FL
i i i ii : v ( c,z ) v ( c,z )   , 0 else, with 
FL *
i i i i i iv ( c, z ) v ( c, z ) ( q ( c, z ))  .  
From an ex-ante perspective, we can assign a Stability Likelihood (SL) that coalition 
c  is stable which is  
1 1
1 1
11 11
, N ,
, N ,
z z
, N , , N ,
z z
SL( c ) ... s( c, )f z ,...,z dz ...dz   z


  .
5
 Average 
expected aggregate valuations over all Pareto-undominated stable coalitions and all 
possible realizations of Z , which is our indicator of global performance, is computed 
as 
 
1 1
1 1
1
11 11
, N ,
, N ,
FL NLNz z
FL FL c C i i
, N , , N ,FL
z z
s ( c, ) v ( c, ))
v v( ( )) ... f z ,...,z dz ...dz
# ( )


     
z z
Z
z


  . 
2.2.4 Relating the Three Models of Learning 
Partial and full learning are identical in the second stage. Hence, when abstracting 
from the stability of coalitions related to the first stage, for every coalition k K  
                                                 
5  This is called expected membership in Kolstad and Ulph (2009). 
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derived from some announcement vector c C , these two models of learning lead to 
the same outcome in the second stage.  
Turning to the first stage, all three models of learning are different. Though 
membership decision under no and partial learning are based on expected valuations, 
they will usually differ. In the case of no learning, expected payoffs are derived from 
maximizing expected payoffs from which an expected abatement vector is derived. In 
the case of partial learning, players derive an equilibrium abatement vector for all 
possible realizations of parameters and then derive expected payoffs by taking 
expectations over all possible realizations of parameters. Finally, under full learning 
both membership and abatement decisions are based on realizations.  
Consequently, under no and partial learning a coalition is either stable or not stable 
whereas under full learning stability depends on the realization of the parameters and 
we calculate a stability likelihood. In order to evaluate the three models of learning, 
we compute the expected aggregate payoff over all players and all Pareto-
undominated stable coalitions. 
A priori little can be predicted about the relation between the three models of learning 
in terms of the final outcome (measured by the indicators of global performance) 
because of the interplay of the three effects mentioned in the introduction 
(information effect, strategic effect and stability effect). General statements are only 
possible for very restrictive assumptions on the functional form of the payoff 
functions and the uncertainty of the parameters (see, e.g. Yi and Shin 1998, Kolstad 
2007 and Kolstad and Ulph 2008, 2009). Therefore, we turn to an evaluation based on 
numerical simulations using an applied climate model which we lay out in the next 
section. 
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3. The Applied Climate Model 
The applied climate model, called Stability of Coalitions model (STACO), builds 
upon the model as presented in Dellink et al. (2008), with a number of extensions 
inspired by Nagashima et al. (2009). We focus only on the main characteristics of the 
model; for a detailed description see Dellink et al. (2008) and Nagashima et al. 
(2009). The core of the model consists of a payoff function that represents the net 
present value of a stream of benefits and costs arising from abatement activities. In 
contrast to Dellink et al. (2008), abatement is not constant but may vary over time. 
The payoff of an individual player i  depends on the abatement matrix Q  of 
dimension N T  and on the vector of parameters iZ  of length   with iBZ  those 
parameters relating to the benefit function itB ( )  and iCZ  those relating to the cost 
function itC ( ) : 
 
1
( , ) (1 ) ( ( ; ) ( ; ))
T
t
i i it t iB it it iC
t
Z r B q Z C q Z 

   Q        (6) 
where the planning horizon is T , t  is the index for time and r  is the discount rate. 
Abatement costs depend on individual abatement itq  and benefits depend on 
aggregate abatement 1
N
it itq q  , reflecting the public good nature of climate change. 
Hence, ( , )i iZ Q  is the net present value of player i  of the stream of benefits and 
costs accruing from own abatement but also from all other players over the entire time 
horizon. We compute the equilibrium abatement path for each possible coalition 
structure which upon substitution in the payoff function delivers discounted 
valuations. They are the basis for taking membership decision and hence we assume 
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fixed membership over the time horizon T .
6
 The time horizon is 100 years, ranging 
from 2011 to 2110.  
We consider twelve world regions; USA (USA), Japan (JPN), European Union - 15 
(EU15), other OECD countries (OOE), Eastern European countries (EET), former 
Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries (EEX), China (CHN), India (IND), 
dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA) and rest of the world (ROW). 
Following Nagashima et al. (2009), we assume an exogenous rate of technological 
progress which reduces abatement costs by 0.5% per annum and a discount rate of 
2%; both are not subject to uncertainty. The functional form of the benefit and cost 
functions of all regions, including the assumptions about the structural parameters 
(mean, standard deviation and distribution) are summarized in the Appendix and 
discussed in Dellink et al. (2008). Here, we only briefly discuss some general 
features. 
The benefit function is a linear approximation of a three-layer carbon cycle proposed 
by Nordhaus (1994) and links current global abatement activities to a stream of future 
avoided damages. The distribution of the global benefit parameter is given by a two-
sided exponential function proposed by Tol (2005) with a mean value of 77 US$/ton. 
The mean values of the regional benefit shares are taken from Finus et al. (2006). Due 
to the large uncertainties associated with these shares, two sets are considered which 
are called Calibration I and II. For the distribution of regional shares we assume in 
accordance with Dellink et al. (2008) a right-skewed gamma distribution function that 
ensures positive regional shares. Abatement costs are given by a cubic function based 
                                                 
6  Fixed membership is a simplifying assumption, though widespread in the literature (e.g. 
Bosello et al. 2003 and Eyckmans and Finus 2006) due to conceptual and computational 
complexities. Flexible membership has only be considered in the stylized models with 
symmetric players in Ulph (2004) and Rubio and Ulph (2007). 
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on Ellerman and Decaux (1998). The stochasticity of this function is driven by a 
scaling parameter with a normal distribution, i.e. the cubic and quadratic term in the 
abatement cost function move together (cf. Dellink et al., 2008). Standard deviations 
of the benefit and abatement cost functions reflect a larger uncertainty about regions’ 
benefit than cost parameters and a larger uncertainty about the parameters of non-
OECD than of OECD regions.  
Undoubtedly, all assumptions are simplifications and some have to be based on 
“guesstimates” (especially with respect to the benefits of abatement) as no better 
information is currently available. Hence, the absolute numbers presented below 
should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, our calibration provides a good 
indication of the relative position of the major world regions. Furthermore, we explicit 
take account of this principal uncertainty by considering five calibration scenarios. 
Compared to the Base Scenario, scenarios 2 to 5 can be viewed as a sequence of 
sensitivity analyses in which only one assumption is modified at a time.  
1) The Base Scenario assumes the parameter values as described above and in the 
Appendix. This implies in particular a discount rate of 2 %, regional benefit shares 
under Calibration I and associated standard deviations as listed in Table A2 in the 
Appendix. 
2) The Lower Discount Rate Scenario assumes a discount rate of only 1% (as opposed 
to 2% in the Base Scenario) which reflects a pure rate of time preference of virtually 
zero (cf. Stern, 2007).  
3) The Higher Discount Rate Scenario assumes a higher discount rate of 3% (as 
opposed to 2% in the Base Scenario), reflecting a higher pure rate of time preference. 
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4) The Higher Variance of Regional Benefits Scenario assumes a standard deviation 
of regional benefit parameters twice as large as in the Base Scenario (and as listed in 
Table A2 in the Appendix), reflecting that the uncertainties in projected damage 
levels are not well-known, especially on a regional scale. 
5) The Different Regional Benefit Shares Scenario assumes alternative mean values 
of regional benefit shares as proposed in Finus et al. (2006) to which we refer as 
Calibration II in Table A2 in the Appendix.
7
 The mean shares in the Base Scenario 
(Calibration I) are relatively large for the OECD regions, due to their high GDP 
levels. In this alternative scenario (Calibration II), larger weights are given to 
damages in developing regions, especially India and Rest-of-the-World. 
Computations are undertaken with Monte Carlo Simulations, drawing 20,000 samples 
from the stochastic model parameters. Equilibrium abatement levels, payoffs, 
transfers, valuations and stable coalitions for the three models of learning are 
computed as described in Section 2.  
4. Results 
4.1 General Remarks 
Tables 1 to 5 show the results for the three models of learning for the five calibration 
scenarios described in Section 3. It is worthwhile pointing out that the reported global 
welfare and final-period concentration levels are expected values, though we may not 
mention this explicitly in the following. Moreover, one statement of caution is in 
order: though the best-performing coalitions (BPSC) in the no and partial learning 
model can be compared, they cannot be directly related to the coalition with the 
                                                 
7  Standard deviations are also adjusted in this scenario such that the ratio between standard 
deviation and mean values are the same as in the Base Scenario. 
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highest stability likelihood (HSLC) in the full learning model. In the former case, the 
largest global welfare level defines “best-performing”, whereas in the latter case the 
highest stability likelihood is the criterion for selection – other coalitions with a lower 
SL may generate higher global welfare levels but are less likely to arise. However, a 
direct comparison is possible for the indicators of global performance, which reflect 
averages over all stable coalitions. Apart from these general statements, the following 
remarks apply. 
{Insert Tables 1-5 around here} 
First, the Nash equilibrium as well as the social optimum coincide for partial and full 
learning in all tables because abatement decisions in the second stage are the same for 
each possible coalition structure.  
Second, the smaller the discount rate, the higher are discounted global welfare levels 
and the lower are final-period concentration levels in the Nash equilibrium and in the 
social optimum (see Tables 1 to 3). This simply follows from the fact that a lower 
discount rate gives more weight to the long-term future benefits from reduced 
greenhouse emissions compared to current abatement costs. The discount rate also 
matters for the potential gains from cooperation: the difference between Nash 
equilibrium and social optimum in terms of global welfare and concentration levels is 
larger for lower discount rates. As a rule of thumb, in our applied model, global 
welfare in the social optimum in all three models of learning is three times larger than 
in the Nash equilibrium. Due to the existence of a non-zero concentrations level in 
2010 and a small natural removal rate of greenhouse gases over time, the difference is 
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less pronounced in terms of concentrations: on average concentrations in 2110 are 
15% lower in the social optimum than in the Nash equilibrium.
8
 
Third, in the no learning model optimal abatement strategies do not depend on the 
variance of regional benefit shares as they are based on expected parameter values. 
Hence, all entries under no learning in Tables 1 and 4 are the same. In contrast, it is 
interesting to observe for the models of full and partial learning that a higher variance 
of regional benefits shares in Table 4 increases the gap between Nash equilibrium and 
social optimum compared to Table 1. The intuition is that the potential gains from 
cooperation increase with the degree of diversity between regions. Whether and under 
which conditions such gains can be reaped through stable agreements will be analyzed 
in section 4.3 below. 
Fourth, in the social optimum regional benefit shares do not matter for optimal 
abatement strategies as the first order conditions require that each region sets 
discounted marginal abatement cost equal to the discounted sum of marginal benefits. 
Hence, the results for the social optimum in Tables 1 (Base Scenario) and 5 (Different 
Regional Benefit Shares Scenario) are the same for each model of learning. 
Fifth, in terms of the number and members of stable coalitions, outcomes are 
relatively robust for four (Tables 1 to 4) of the five calibration scenarios. For all three 
models of learning, main differences occur for different regional benefit shares (Table 
5) as they crucially determine the distribution of gains from cooperation. For no and 
partial learning without transfers there is a unique non-trivial coalition (which Pareto-
dominates the trivial coalition) for all five calibration scenarios. With transfers, the 
                                                 
8  Note that concentration levels in the Nash equilibrium are already lower than in Business-as-
usual, as some abatement is undertaken by regions. The numbers have to be viewed as an 
approximation as our model does not contain a full climate module. 
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number of stable coalitions is much larger (e.g. 105 for no learning and 41 for partial 
learning in the Base Scenario, Table 1), in line with the results from deterministic 
models (e.g. Carraro et al. 2006, Eyckmans and Finus 2006 and Nagashima et al. 
2009). For full learning, stability likelihood is always below 30% (e.g. 23.7% without 
and 15.9% with transfers in the Base Scenario, Table 1). 
4.2 Comparing the Three Models of Learning: Abstracting from Stability 
In order to analyze how the three effects described in the introduction (information, 
strategic and stability effect) influence the outcome in the three models of learning, 
we abstract from stability in a first step. This allows us to isolate the information and 
strategic effect from the stability effect. This implies that we only look at the second 
stage of coalition formation. 
Result 1: Global Welfare and Concentration Abstracting from Stability 
In each calibration scenario, and in every coalition structure, the following ranking 
with respect to global welfare levels and concentration levels applies for the three 
models of learning: 
Global Welfare:   FL=PL>NL  Concentration:   FL=PL>NL. 
First note that Result 1 can be seen in Tables 1 to 5 only in terms of the social 
optimum, corresponding to the grand coalition, and the Nash equilibrium, 
corresponding to the singleton coalition structure. The statement that this ranking 
applies to all 4084 possible coalition structures derives from additional computations 
which are available upon request.  
Second, consider the social optimum. Since all regions form the grand coalition, only 
the information effect matters. In qualitative terms, this effect implies that global 
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welfare for partial and full learning is higher than for no learning as predicted by 
theory. In quantitative terms, it is interesting that this difference is substantial in our 
applied model.
9
 Taking the average over the five calibration scenarios global welfare 
in the social optimum is almost 50% higher with learning than without learning. In 
contrast, for concentrations this relation is reversed, suggesting that regions on 
average abate more without learning. The average over the five calibration scenarios 
gives a 3.5% lower concentration level in 2110 for no learning than learning in the 
social optimum. The intuition is that under no learning regions choose abatement only 
on average correctly, which leads to overshooting on average compared to learning 
where they always get it “right”.10 The policy relevance of this result is that the 
conventional wisdom may be wrong that more information leads to better outcomes. 
In our applied model, this is true in terms of payoffs, but not in terms environmental 
effectiveness. 
Third, consider the Nash equilibrium. Now the strategic effect comes into play which 
is particularly pronounced because all players behave non-cooperatively. Again, 
global concentration levels are higher with than without learning (1% as an average 
over the five calibration scenarios), and this is also true for global welfare (37% as an 
average over the five calibration scenarios). As the strategic effect works in the 
opposite direction of the information effect, we can conclude that, in our model, the 
information effect dominates the strategic effect, leading to higher global welfare but 
also higher concentration with than without learning. In our model, this applies not 
                                                 
9  In the theoretical models of Kolstad (2007) and Kolstad and Ulph (2008, 2009) the 
information and the strategic effects are zero. 
10  Due to the complexity of our model with heterogeneous players and uncertainty about the 
benefit and cost parameters, we cannot analytically prove the ranking FL=PL>NL for 
concentrations, neither for the social optimum nor for any other coalition structure. Already 
Ulph (1998) pointed out that no general results with respect to abatement are available for 
the Nash equilibrium and social optimum in two period models.  
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only to the Nash equilibrium with no cooperation but also to all non-trivial coalition 
structures of partial cooperation. 
Result 2: Regional Welfare Abstracting from Stability  
In each calibration scenario, and in every coalition structure, the following ranking 
with respect to regional welfare levels applies for the three models of learning: 
Non-members without and with transfers: FL=PL>NL  
Members without transfers:   FL=PL 
Members with transfers:   FL=PL>NL. 
Result 2 is interesting as a preparation for our stability analysis in section 4.3 and 
draws again on the computations for all possible coalition structures (not displayed in 
Tables 1 to 5 but available upon request). It illustrates our claim that analytical 
predictions about the outcome in the three models of learning are difficult. First, non-
members’ payoffs are always higher with learning.11 Since this is not necessarily true 
for members in the setting without transfers, it may well be that this results in smaller 
coalitions for learning. Second, even though with transfers all players are better off 
with learning, both the incentive to stay in a coalition and the incentive to stay outside 
the coalition increase. Hence, predictions of what this implies for stability are not 
straightforward.  
                                                 
11  One would expect that non-members are better off under no learning than under learning as 
they benefit from lower concentration levels (cf. Result 1). This is certainly true and hence 
the strategic effect from learning is negative for non-members. However, it appears that in 
our model the positive information effect from learning is stronger. 
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4.3 Comparing the Three Models of Learning: Including Stability 
We now include the first stage of coalition formation in our analysis of overall 
success of coalition formation (i.e. Global Performance in Tables 1 to 5) for the three 
models of learning. 
Result 3: Global Performance Including Stability 
In each calibration scenario, the following ranking applies:  
Expected Global Welfare 
No Transfers:   PL>FL>NL   Transfers:   FL>PL>NL 
Expected Concentration 
No Transfers:  FL>PL>NL   Transfers:   PL>FL, NL>FL. 
Result 3 suggests that in terms of global welfare both models of learning perform 
better than no learning, only the ranking of partial and full learning is reversed for 
transfers. This is in sharp contrast to the findings in stylized models that “learning is 
bad”. Na and Shin (1998) find NL>FL and Kolstad (2007) and Kolstad and Ulph 
(2009, 2009) find NL>FL>PL in most cases and in a very few cases PL>NL>FL. 
Though they do no consider transfers, even without transfers our results are just the 
opposite. 
One reason for this difference that applies to all these models is that they consider 
only uncertainty about the benefits from abatement whereas we consider also 
uncertainty about the abatement costs. In particular, in Na and Shin (1998) regional 
benefits are assumed to be negatively correlated but ex-ante all players expect the 
same benefits. Thus, learning without transfers leads to asymmetric gains from 
cooperation in their model, upsetting large stable coalitions with learning. In contrast, 
in our model, regional benefit shares are not correlated, expectations are not identical 
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without learning, possible asymmetries on the benefit side may be compensated (or 
aggravated) by asymmetries on the cost side and finally, asymmetries can be 
mitigated through transfers.  
Another reason for this difference relates to the linear payoff function in Kolstad 
(2007) and Kolstad and Ulph (2009) implying very different driving forces. In their 
model the equilibrium abatement choice is binary: abate or not abate. Consequently, 
what we call the information and strategic effects do not exist in their model. 
Moreover, in their model, stable coalitions can only be a knife-edge equilibrium: once 
a coalition member leaves, the coalition breaks apart as for the remaining coalition 
members it no longer pays to abate. This causes a positive effect from learning in 
terms of the size of stable coalitions but has a negative effect on global welfare. 
Clearly, in our model, a larger coalition size would always produce higher welfare if 
no other effects are at work. 
Result 3 also suggests that what has already been observed abstracting from stability 
considerations also holds when including stability, at least without transfers: both 
models of learning lead to higher concentration levels. With transfers this is different. 
In particular full learning benefits from transfers which make it possible to stabilize 
much larger coalitions. This translates not only into higher expected welfare but also 
into higher expected abatement and thus lower expected concentration levels. The 
ranking of partial and no learning depends on the calibration scenario. For the Base 
Scenario, partial learning implies higher concentrations, both without and with 
transfers, but this may be reversed for other scenarios.  
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Result 4: Global Performance Including Stability: The Role of Transfers 
In each calibration scenario, and in each model of learning, expected global welfare 
levels are higher and expected concentration levels are lower with transfers than 
without transfers.  
Let the relative gain from cooperation be measured by the difference between stable 
IEAs and the Nash equilibrium over the difference between the social optimum and 
the Nash equilibrium. The average relative gains from forming IEAs in the five 
calibration scenarios are given by:  
Global Welfare: 
No Transfers: NL: 2.67%, PL: 3.97%, FL: 1.2% 
Transfers: NL: 26.31%, PL: 38.73%, FL: 63.29% 
Concentration: 
No Transfers: NL: 2.11%, PL: 2.80%, FL: 1.30% 
Transfers: NL: 18.41%, PL: 29.29%, FL: 46.73%. 
Hence, without transfers, the relative gains from stable cooperation are rather small 
for all three models of learning, regardless whether this is measured in terms of global 
welfare or concentration levels. Apart from the omnipresent free-rider incentives 
well-known from the literature (e.g. Carraro and Siniscalco 1993 and Barrett 1994), 
one reason is that the gains from cooperation are unequally distributed as regions are 
quite heterogeneous in terms of benefits and abatement cost in our applied model. The 
almost ideal transfer scheme mitigates these differences in an optimal way (e.g. 
Eyckmans and Finus 2006), taking account of the regional incentive structure. This 
drastically increases the success of coalition formation for all three models of 
learning, but this is no guarantee that the social optimum is obtained. The 
improvement through transfers is particular pronounced for the model of full learning. 
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Roughly speaking, without transfers, the expected payoffs under no and partial 
learning are on average more symmetric than the “true” payoffs under full learning on 
which membership decisions are based in the first stage. This hampers the formation 
of large coalitions under full learning. However, once transfers are introduced, the 
benefits from full learning can be fully reaped. A similar driving force underlies also 
the next result. 
Result 5: Global Performance Including Stability: The Role of Diversity 
A higher variance of regional benefits in a setting without transfers (with transfers) 
implies lower (higher) expected global welfare levels and higher (lower) expected 
concentration levels for the two models of learning. 
Result 5 compares Tables 1 and 4. As pointed out above, the variance of regional 
benefits does not matter for no learning as longs as the expected parameter value 
remains the same. For the models of full and partial learning, a higher variance of 
regional benefits translates also into a higher variance in payoffs among members and 
ceteris paribus increases the heterogeneity among regions. Without transfers, this 
poses an obstacle to form large stable coalitions as it implies a more asymmetric 
distribution of the gains from cooperation. With transfers, this obstacle is removed 
and diversity is now an asset. Not only does the coalition benefit from internalizing 
the externality among its members but also from a cost-effective allocation of 
abatement duties. The larger the asymmetry, the more pronounced is the difference 
between the cost-effective coalitional and cost-ineffective Nash abatement levels and 
hence the larger are the gains from cooperation. This finding is in line with McGinty 
(2007) and Weikard (2009) who show that with transfers coalition formation may be 
more successful if players are more heterogeneous. 
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5. Summary and Conclusion 
In stylized models, which capture the strategic aspects of self-enforcing climate treaty 
formation, it has been shown that learning has a negative impact on the success of 
cooperation. This result is intriguing and runs counter to all intensified research 
efforts in climate change in recent years, aiming at reducing uncertainty about the 
impacts of climate change and the costs involved in mitigation. In this paper, we pose 
the question whether the negative conclusion about the role of learning holds more 
generally if the restrictive assumptions of the stylized models are relaxed. We use a 
calibrated climate change model with twelve world regions, which captures the 
dynamics of greenhouse gas accummulation in the atmosphere, the timing when the 
benefits and costs from climate mitigation occur and the large heterogeneity across 
regions, to address this question. The distribution of the uncertain parameters of the 
benefit and cost functions are generated through a Monte Carlo Simulation technique. 
The large uncertainties still surrounding these uncertain parameters is accounted for 
through sensitivity analyses. Three models of learning are investigated: full learning 
where all players learn the actual values of all model parameters before the game is 
played; partial learning where information is revealed after players announce whether 
to join the treaty, but before decisions are taken on abatement levels; and no learning 
where both stages of the game are played under uncertainty. 
In our numerical model, we derive much more positive conclusions about the role of 
learning. Though uncertainty leads to an overshooting of abatement efforts and hence 
ignorance can pay in ecological terms, in welfare terms, this is reversed. The same 
conclusion remains valid once stability is explicitly accounted for. This is done by 
evaluating the average success over all Pareto-undominated stable coalitions under all 
three models of learning. Even in ecological terms learning turns out to have a 
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positive impact in our model once we consider transfers. These transfers are designed 
such that they avoid a too asymmetric distribution of the gains from cooperation and 
they explicitly take into account the different incentives of the various world regions 
to leave or join a climate agreement. Under all three models of learning these transfers 
improve upon the success of climate agreements: larger coalitions can be stabilized 
and membership can be bought of regions with low abatement cost options, despite 
their little incentive to participate because of low benefits. The importance of transfer 
increases with the degree of learning. In our model this is because on average the 
gains from cooperation are more symmetrically distributed ex ante than ex post. 
Hence, without transfers, learning would have a negative impact on some regions’ 
willingness to sign a climate treaty. The importance of transfers also increases with 
the degree of asymmetry between regions. Without transfers, asymmetry is an 
obstacle for forming large and effective agreements. With transfers, asymmetry 
becomes an asset. Members of the agreement benefit from exploiting the comparative 
advantage of cooperation. This constitutes a significant counterpoint to the 
omnipresent free-rider incentive caused by the public good nature of climate change 
mitigation.  
The last point suggests one avenue of future research. Under the Kyoto Protocol and 
probably also in future climate treaties transfers are not paid in a lump sum fashion as 
we assumed. However, transfers are implicitly part of the emission permit trading 
system under the Kyoto Protocol, the European Trading System (EU-TS) and most 
likely a future US-Trading system. Hence, it will be important to work out how the 
structure of the transfer scheme which we considered in our analysis can be replicated 
through the allocation of permits if they are given out for free or how the auction 
mechanism has to be designed if emitters are expected to bid for emission rights  
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Another point we deem important in future research concerns the role of learning. 
First, learning could be modeled as a dynamic process in which agents update beliefs 
in a Bayesian sense. Second, the possibility that agents can invest in learning and the 
effect on endogenous technological change could be integrated in the analysis. Both 
points would also suggest to depart from the assumption of fixed membership and to 
allow for the revision of membership in a climate agreement over time as considered 
for instance in Ulph (2004) and Rubio and Ulph (2007). No doubt this will require 
major conceptual and computational advances in the theory of dynamic coalition 
formation with heterogeneous players. 
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Appendix: Parameters of the Applied Model 
Payoffs are the net present value of the stream of abatement as specified in equation (6) in the text. 
Benefits from abatement equal the net present value (in period t) of future avoided damages: 
    ( ; ) 0; ;it t iB is iB is t iB
s t
B q Z D Z D q Z


   . 
Damages are a linearized link between abatement and climate impacts: 
( ; ) γ γis t iB i i s t t D sD q Z s q Y        where γi  is a scaling parameter that has no effect on benefits as 
it cancels out, is  are regional damage shares, -s t  reflects the fraction of emissions in period t still 
in the atmosphere in period s, calculated as  - 0.64 1 0.00866
s t
s t

    (cf. Nordhaus 1994). 
Furthermore, tY  is global GDP (projections taken from the MIT-EPPA model; Paltsev et al. 2005) 
and Dγ  is the stochastic scale parameter of global damages as given below.  
Concentration of CO2 starts at an exogenous level of 390 ppm in 2010; the final period 
concentration level is then calculated by adding global emissions (E) minus abatement (q) between 
2011 and 2110, taking into account their decay:   
2110
2110 2010 2110
2011
s s s
s
M M E q 

    . 
Abatement costs are formulated following Ellerman and Decaux (1998), adjusted for an exogenous 
technological progress parameter ( =0.005) to reflect the dynamic nature of our model: 
1 13 2
3 2
( ; ) α (1-ς) β (1 ς)        t tit it iC i it i itC q Z q q  
The distribution functions of the stochastic parameters are described in detail in Dellink et al. 
(2008) and are reproduced here. 
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Table A1: Characteristics of the 2-sided Exponential Distribution Function of the Global 
Benefit Parameter D. 
  Value 
 5% density -9 $/tC 
 Mode 5 $/tC 
 density at mode 13% 
 95% density 245 $/tC 
 Mean 77 $/tC 
 
Table A2: Characteristics of the Gamma Distribution Function of Regional Benefit Shares 
i
s  
Region Lower  
bound 
Mean 
Calibration I 
(Scenarios 1 to 4) 
Standard  
deviation 
Mean  
Calibration II (Scenario 
5) 
USA 0 0.2263 0.1414 0.124 
JPN 0 0.1725 0.1078 0.114 
EEC 0 0.2360 0.1475 0.064 
OOE 0 0.0345 0.0216 0.017 
EET 0 0.0130 0.0130 0.013 
FSU 0 0.0675 0.0675 0.035 
EEX 0 0.0300 0.0300 0.030 
CHN 0 0.0620 0.0620 0.062 
IND 0 0.0500 0.1000 0.171 
DAE 0 0.0249 0.0498 0.085 
BRA 0 0.0153 0.0306 0.052 
ROW 0 0.0680 0.1360 0.233 
 
 iii 
Table A3: Characteristics of the Normal Distribution of the Abatement Cost Parameters 
i
  
and 
i
 . 
 
i   i  
Region Mean Standard 
deviation 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
USA 0.00050 0.00006  0.00398 0.00050 
JPN 0.01550 0.00194  0.18160 0.02270 
EEC 0.00240 0.00030  0.01503 0.00188 
OOE 0.00830 0.00104  0.00000 0.00000 
EET 0.00790 0.00198  0.00486 0.00122 
FSU 0.00230 0.00058  0.00042 0.00011 
EEX 0.00320 0.00080  0.03029 0.00757 
CHN 0.00007 0.00002  0.00239 0.00060 
IND 0.00150 0.00038  0.00787 0.00197 
DAE 0.00470 0.00118  0.03774 0.00944 
BRA 0.56120 0.14030  0.84974 0.21244 
ROW 0.00210 0.00053  0.00805 0.00201 
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Table 1: Outcome of Coalition Formation and Learning: Base Scenario* 
Coalition Global Welfare  
(bln US$) 
Concentration  
(giga tons carbon) 
 No Learning 
Nash Equilibrium 10,427.9 1,432.2 
Social Optimum 29,490.6 1,248.4 
 No Transfers 
BPSC (JPN, EEC) [1] 10,910.9 1,428.5 
Global Performance 10,910.9 1,428.5 
 Transfers 
BPSC (USA, EET, CHN IND, 
DAE) [105] 
18,940 1,374.8 
Global Performance 15,385.8 1,398.4 
 Partial Learning 
Nash Equilibrium 14,702.7 1,445.4 
Social Optimum 43,348.3 1,287.6 
 No Transfers 
BPSC (JPN, EEC) [1] 15,475.3 1,442.1 
Global Performance 15,475.3 1,442.1 
 Transfers 
BPSC (USA, EET, CHN, IND, 
ROW) [41] 
29,374.8 1,387.8 
Global Performance 24,342.6 1,407.7 
 Full Learning 
Nash Equilibrium 14,702.7 1,445.4 
Social Optimum 43,348.3 1,287.6 
 No Transfers 
HSLC (JPN, EEC) [0.237] 15,475.3 1,442.1 
Global Performance 15,142.7 1,443.1 
 Transfers 
HSLC (EEC, OOE, EET, EEX, 
CHN, IND, DAE, BRA, ROW) 
[0.159] 
34,788.1 1,362.7 
Global Performance 30,795.9 1,381.6 
* Calibration of Base Scenario see section 3. This implies in particular a discount rate of r 0.02 , benefit 
shares with mean values under Calibration I and standard deviations as listed in Table A2. Global Welfare: 
sum of discounted expected payoffs over all regions in bln US$ in 2010; Concentration: expected 
concentration in giga tons carbon in 2110; Nash Equilibrium corresponds to singleton coalition structure; 
Social Optimum corresponds to all regions forming the grand coalition; BPSC=best performing stable 
coalition in terms of expected global welfare under no and partial learning with [..] the total number of stable 
non-trivial coalitions; HSLC=coalition with the highest stability likelihood under full learning among all 
possible coalitions with [..] the stability likelihood of this coalition; Global Performance: expected global 
welfare and expected concentration over all Pareto-undominated stable coalitions as explained in section 2; 
all numbers are rounded to the first digit. 
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Table 2: Outcome of Coalition Formation and Learning: Lower Discount Rate Scenario* 
Coalition Global Welfare  
(bln US$) 
Concentration  
(giga tons carbon) 
 No Learning 
Nash Equilibrium 36,989.3 1412.3 
Social Optimum 100,758.3 1178.9 
 No Transfers 
BPSC (JPN, EEC) [1] 38,674.7 1,407.3 
Global Performance 38,674.7 1,407.3 
 Transfers 
BPSC (USA, EET, CHN, IND, 
DAE) [105] 
65,796.3 1,337.9 
Global Performance 53,765.8 1,368.3 
 Partial Learning 
Nash Equilibrium 50,903.8 1,430.3 
Social Optimum 142,106.9 1,236.5 
 No Transfers 
BPSC (JPN, EEC) [1] 53,571.8 1,425.9 
Global Performance 53,571.8 1,425.9 
 Transfers 
BPSC (USA, EET, EEX, CHN, 
IND) [54] 
93,209 1,364.3 
Global Performance 75,858.5 1,391.2 
 Full Learning 
Nash Equilibrium 50,903.8 1,430.3 
Social Optimum 142,106.9 1,236.5 
 No Transfers 
HSLC (JPN, EEC) [0.246] 53,571.8 1,425.9 
Global Performance 52,211.2 1,426.7 
 Transfers 
HSLC (USA, OOE, EET, EEX, 
CHN, IND, DAE, BRA, ROW) 
[0.162] 
116,736.6 1,321.8 
Global Performance 101,431.7 1,349.9 
* Calibration of “Lower Discount Rate Scenario” see section 3. This implies a discount rate of r 0.01  
instead of r 0.02  as assumed in the Base Scenario; all other assumptions are the same. Notation: see Table 
1. 
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Table 3: Outcome of Coalition Formation and Learning: Higher Discount Rate Scenario* 
Coalition Global Welfare  
(bln US$) 
Concentration  
(giga tons carbon) 
 No Learning 
Nash Equilibrium 4,093.4 1,442.9 
Social Optimum 11,924.6 1,287 
 No Transfers 
BPSC (JPN, EEC) [1] 4,288.1 1,439.8 
Global Performance 4,288.1 1,439.8 
 Transfers 
BPSC (USA, EET, CHN, IND, 
DAE) [109] 
7,608 1,394.2 
Global Performance 6,137.4 1,414.2 
 Partial Learning 
Nash Equilibrium 5,826.3 1,453.7 
Social Optimum 17,925.1 1,317.8 
 No Transfers 
BPSC (JPN, EEC) [1] 6,140,9 1,450.9 
Global Performance 6,140.9 1,450.9 
 Transfers 
BPSC (USA, EET, CHN, IND, 
ROW)) [35] 
12,013.7 1,404.8 
Global Performance 10,085.7 1,420.2 
 Full Learning 
Nash Equilibrium 5,826.3 1,453.7 
Social Optimum 17,925.1 1,317.8 
 No Transfers 
HSLC (JPN, EEC) [0.247] 6,140.9 1,450.9 
Global Performance 6,005.9 1,451.8 
 Transfers 
HSLC (USA, OOE, EET, EEX, 
CHN, IND, DAE, BRA, ROW) 
[0.16] 
14,605.1 1,380.4 
Global Performance 12,578 1,399.3 
* Calibration of “Higher Discount Rate Scenario” see section 3. This implies a discount rate of r 0.03  
instead of r 0.02  as assumed in the Base Scenario; all other assumptions are the same. Notation: see Table 
1. 
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Table 4: Outcome of Coalition Formation and Learning: Higher Variance of Regional Benefit 
Shares Scenario* 
Coalition Global Welfare  
(bln US$) 
Concentration  
(giga tons carbon) 
 No Learning 
Nash Equilibrium 10,427.9 1,432.2 
Social Optimum 29,490.6 1,248.4 
 No Transfers 
BPSC (JPN, EEC) [1] 10,910.9 1,428.5 
Global Performance 10,910.9 1,428.5 
 Transfers 
BPSC (USA, EET, CHN, IND, 
DAE) [105] 
18,940 1,374.8 
Global Performance 15,385.8 1,398.4 
 Partial Learning 
Nash Equilibrium 12,899.7 1,454.4  
Social Optimum 47,127 1,295.9 
 No Transfers 
BPSC (JPN, EEC) [1] 13,815.6 1,451 
Global Performance 13,815.6 1,451 
 Transfers 
BPSC (USA, EEC, EET, EEX, 
CHN, IND, ROW) [9] 
35,757 1,359.2 
Global Performance 30,168.4 1,382.4 
 Full Learning 
Nash Equilibrium 12,899.7 1,454.4 
Social Optimum 47,127 1,295.9 
 No Transfers 
HSLC (JPN, EEC) [0.143] 13,815.6 1,451.0 
Global Performance 13,210.4 1,452.6 
 Transfers 
HSLC (grand coalition) [0.217] 47,127 1,295.9 
Global Performance 38,156.1 1,352.5 
* Calibration of case “Higher Variance of Regional Benefits” see section 3. This implies a higher variance of 
regional benefits than assumed in the Base Case (standard deviation doubled as listed in Table A2); all other 
assumptions are the same. Notation: see Table 1. 
 V 
Table 5: Outcome of Coalition Formation and Learning: Different Regional Benefit Shares 
Scenario* 
Coalition Global Welfare  
(bln US$) 
Concentration  
(giga tons carbon) 
 No Learning 
Nash Equilibrium 10,224.5  1,433.5  
Social Optimum 29,490.6  1,248.4  
 No Transfers 
BPSC (JPN, BRA, ROW) [1] 10,829.9  1,429  
Global Performance 10,829.9  1,429  
 Transfers 
BPSC (USA, EET, CHN, ROW) 
[53] 
18,850.1 1,374.2 
Global Performance 15,456.6 1,399.3 
 Partial Learning 
Nash Equilibrium 14,360.3  1,448.7  
Social Optimum 43,348.3 1,287.6 
 No Transfers 
BPSC (IND, BRA, ROW) [1] 16,958.3  1,439.8  
Global Performance 16,958.3  1,439.8  
 Transfers 
BPSC (EEC, OOE, EET, FSU, 
CHN, IND, ROW) [19] 
33,796.5 1,374.1 
Global Performance 27,988.3 1,396.7 
 Full Learning 
Nash Equilibrium 14,360.3  1,448.7  
Social Optimum 43,348.3  1,287.6  
 No Transfers 
HSLC (JPN, BRA) [0.128] 14,484 1,448.3 
Global Performance 14,552.4  1,447.6  
 Transfers 
HSLC(grand coalition) [0.15] 43,348.3 1,287.6 
Global Performance 36,221.4  1,371.8 
* Calibration of “Different Regional Benefit Shares Scenario” see section 3. This implies regional benefit 
shares according to Calibration II, Table A2, which differ from Calibration I in the Base Scenario; all other 
assumptions are the same. Notation: see Table 1. 
 
